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ABSTRACT
Our objective in this paper is to define jurisdictional advantage, the recognition that location is
critical to firms’ innovative success and that every location has unique assets that are not easily
replicated.  The purpose is to be normative and policy oriented.   Drawing from the well-developed
literature on corporate strategy, we consider analogies to cities in their search for competitive
advantage.  In contrast to the more passive term locational advantage, our use of the term jurisdiction
denotes geographically-defined legal and political decision-making authority and coordination.
Thus, jurisdictions may be constructed and managed to promote a coherent activity set.  We review
recent advances in our understanding of patterns of urban specialization and the composition of
activities within cities, which suggest strategies that may generate economic growth as well as those
strategies  to  avoid.    This  paper  then  considers  the  role  of  firms  and  their  responsibility  to
jurisdictions in light of the net benefits received from place-specific externalities, and concludes by
considering the challenges to implementing jurisdictional advantage.
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Economic growth is a preoccupation among economists and government policy makers.   
Traditionally the focus has been at the national level, however research has shifted the focus to 
lower geographic units defined as clusters of industrial activities or alternatively as regions.  The 
literature suggests that economic growth is a local process and that cities are an important, if not 
the  most  important  economic  unit,  in  generating  new  development,  competitiveness  and 
prosperity.  When we talk about geographically-defined clusters of industrial activity or regional 
economic development we are really talking about cities and the activities that take place within 
the city’s sphere of influence
1.  It has not been popular to talk about cities in a policy context for 
several decades in the United States; however, the new economic geography literature suggests 
that the time has come to focus on cities and the construction of what we term jurisdictional 
advantage as a means to promote economic growth and prosperity.   
Research has established that cities, due to the geographic proximity of firms and other 
institutions,  provide  localized  knowledge  externalities  or  spillovers  that  provide  positive 
economic value.  Moreover, cities increase opportunities for interaction that facilitates learning 
and  the  absorption  of  knowledge,  provide  a  venue  for  experimentation  with  new  ideas  and 
enhance the ability to exchange ideas and engage with others who have relevant expertise.  As a 
result, firms in these locations enjoy higher productivity, greater innovation and growth, and pay 
higher wages.  A growing literature documents these advantages. However, these topics have   2 
more than an academic interest.  The literature begs the question: if you are responsible for a 
jurisdiction, what should you do to promote prosperity and economic growth? 
Our  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  define  jurisdictional  advantage,  the  recognition  that 
location is critical to firms’ innovative success and that every location has unique assets that are 
not easily replicated.  The purpose is to be normative and policy oriented.   Drawing from the 
well-developed literature on corporate strategy, we consider analogies to cities in their search for 
competitive advantage.  In contrast to the more passive term locational advantage, our use of the 
term jurisdiction denotes geographically-defined legal and political decision-making authority 
and coordination.  Thus, jurisdictions may be constructed and managed to promote a coherent 
activity set.  We review recent advances in our understanding of patterns of urban specialization 
and  the  composition  of  activities  within  cities,  which  suggest  strategies  that  may  generate 
economic growth as well as those strategies to avoid.  This paper then considers the role of firms 
and their responsibility to jurisdictions in light of the net benefits received from place-specific 
externalities,  and  concludes  by  considering  the  challenges  to  implementing  jurisdictional 
advantage.   
 
 
Alternatives to Shaping a Jurisdiction 
 
There  are  two  extreme  philosophies  available  to  policy  makers  to  foster  economic 
development.  One potential approach is laissez-faire – simply letting market forces work.  The 
rationale  is  that  industrial  clusters  that  are  part  of  successful  cities  arise  for  a  variety  of 
historically contingent or serendipitous factors not easily replicated.  Firms locate and invest in a 
particular city for reasons that are not well understood, much less predictable and controllable.  
This view suggests that the most constructive thing a jurisdiction can do is let market forces   3 
determine its future fate and simply hope for the best.  Given the challenges of jurisdictional 
decision-making, the laissez-faire approach has some appeal but it is not without drawbacks.  
Since  industrial  development  demonstrates  high  levels  of  path  dependence  and  increasing 
returns, if a city misses out on an important trend, new technology or infrastructure investment 
on the basis of a laissez-faire attitude, it may miss out for a very long time.  Moreover, the 
existence of market failures associated with innovative activity inhibits the efficient allocation of 
resources, suggesting that there may be a role for government involvement.   
An opposing philosophy advocates aggressive planning towards a targeted industry in 
what is a “if you build it they will come” philosophy.  Typically, politicians and civic leaders 
focus on some emerging, high-growth industry with great fanfare, high-profile events and the 
commitment  of  substantial  public  resources.    These  efforts  are  often  mimicked  by  similar 
jurisdictions in a classic bandwagon effect.  For example, currently, forty-eight of the fifty states 
currently have biotechnology initiatives (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2001).  Most of 
these  focus  on  human  therapeutics  and  attempt  to  leverage  local  universities  and  medical 
schools.   
There are numerous examples where governments have not been able to establish clusters 
by  fiat.    One  illustrative  example  is  New  Jersey’s  failed  attempt  to  replicate  the  success  of 
Silicon  Valley  (Leslie  and  Kargon,  1997).    Despite  the  presence  of  prominent  research 
universities and substantial private R&D sector, the net effect was several strategic partnerships 
rather than broad-based economic development.  Even in cases where policymakers were able to 
implement an economic development vision, as in the case of Research Triangle Park, Link 
(1995, 2002) documents that it took over fifty  years of concerted efforts to begin to realize 
measurable outcomes.  Even when efforts are successful at generating start-up companies it is   4 
difficult for a jurisdiction to garner longer term benefits if complementary assets are lacking 
(Connecticut Center for a New Economy 2004).   
The nature of innovation makes it difficult to dictate industrial clusters.  Commercializing 
technological  breakthroughs  requires  translating  scientific  potential  into  consumer  needs  and 
product markets.  At its earliest stages, before applications are easily described or generally 
appreciated, locating near the center of innovative activity provides critical competitive business 
advantage.    Realizing  the  potential  of  a  technological  breakthrough  requires  a  sophisticated 
understanding of consumer needs, existing markets for product innovation and factor inputs and 
prevailing  production  technology.    Co-location  increases  awareness  of  emerging  trends  and 
reduces  uncertainty  for  firms.    Innovation  clusters  spatially  in  locations  where  knowledge 
externalities reduce the costs of discovery and commercialization.   
When a technology reaches a stage when it can be easily understood and valued, the 
established centers – the first movers – already have an advantage.  Increasing returns is a feature 
of  innovation  and  knowledge-based  industrial  activity.    As  a  result,  there  is  a  tendency  for 
activities which are ahead to get even further ahead (Arthur 1996).   By the time an industry is 
well-known enough to be targeted for economic development other jurisdictions have probably 
already  captured  the  lion’s  share  of  the  benefits  and  are  positioned  for  greater  advantage.  
Moreover, the path of emerging industries is difficult to predict and is extremely fluid.  Planning 
efforts  based  on  current  assumptions  will  never  be  able  to  anticipate  future  scientific 
developments and the direction that a technology may take.  Consider the Internet as a case in 
point.  In 1990, few, if any, jurisdictions focused on this technology but by the middle of the 
decade, the country was caught in dot-com-mania with numerous public sector initiatives, tax 
incentives and business incubators that have mostly been abandoned now.     5 
A  middle  alternative  to  the  two  philosophies  discussed  may  be  ableto  influence  the 
quality and shape of economic outcomes by making judicious investments and avoiding costly 
mistakes – deliberately constructing jurisdictional advantage by building on existing, not easily 
replicated resources and by complementing private sector activities.  The pursuit of jurisdictional 
advantage is not without challenges because there are so many factors that influence outcomes.  
However, given that future prosperity and quality of life are at stake, questions of how this might 
be done are of more than just academic interest.  
   
 
Corporate Strategy as an Analogy 
 
We believe a helpful analogy can be made between jurisdictions and firms with respect to 
strategic advantage.  Certainly, cities have more complex objective functions overall than do 
firms. However when we think about economic development specifically within the context of 
cluster  formation  and  industrial  competitiveness,  the  analogy  is  instructive.    For  firms,  the 
overarching goal is to gain and maintain competitive advantage, which translates into above 
average  returns  for  shareholders.    The  way  to  achieve  competitive  advantage  is  to  create  a 
competitive strategy that is consistent with trends in the firm’s industry and appropriate to the 
firm’s resources and capabilities.   
One important school of competitive strategy holds that competitive advantage arises 
from the concept of creating a unique activity system, which is achieved either by an advantage 
of low cost or by way of differentiation (Porter 1980).  A unique activity system is a web of 
activities that, when working together, provide an advantage that is difficult, if not impossible, 
for  competitors  to  replicate,  because  the  individual  activities  fit  well  together  and  actually 
reinforce each other.  For example, Southwest Airlines has been the most successful airline in the   6 
US market over the past 30 years, in level of profitability, stability of earnings and growth in 
market share.  Competitive advantage is not achieved through any single thing it does such as 
flying  a  completely  standard  fleet  of  Boeing  737s,  or  by  flying  from  secondary  airports,  or 
having the most frequent daily departures from each of its locations, or by utilizing the Internet 
rather than travel agents for booking. Rather, Southwest achieves advantage by performing all of 
these  (and  more)  activities  in  ways  that  fit  together  and  reinforce  each  other  to  produce  a 
significant and sustainable cost advantage over all of its competitors, while offering high and 
consistent service to its customers. Any competitor would have to match every single aspect of 
Southwest’s activity system to challenge the overall outcome – and thus far no competitor has 
been successful in doing so (Porter 1996).   
The activity system can provide a low cost advantage by enabling the firm to produce a 
product or service for a segment of customers that is roughly equivalent to that of the competitor 
at a significantly lower cost – resulting in higher profitability than the average competitor as is 
the case for Southwest Airlines.   It is important to note that being a low cost firm is not the same 
as being a low price firm.  Having the same cost structure as competitors and deciding to sell at a 
lower profit margin is not a strategy for long term advantage, but rather a strategy of transferring 
value from corporate shareholders to customers. It is simply not a sustainable long-term strategy.  
Any competitive firm that objects to inroads made on the base of a low price approach can 
simply cut its own prices and margins to compete.  This, ultimately, leads to a race to the bottom 
in terms of profitability.  And any firm with a cost advantage in the industry in question will be 
able to set prices lower and force the low price player out of the industry.  In many respects, 
numerous dot-com bubble firms employed the ultimate low price strategy – giving away their 
product or service – and confused both themselves and the capital markets into believing it was a   7 
sensible strategy.  It was not sound because low price is not a viable strategy in the absence of 
low costs.   
Alternatively,  a  firm’s  activity  system  can  provide  a  differentiation  advantage  by 
enabling the firm to produce a product or service that is considered to be uniquely more valuable 
than those of competitors by a segment of customers and for which those customers are willing, 
even happy, to pay a premium price.  For example, Progressive Insurance offers a differentiated 
automobile insurance service to a non-standard segment of drivers.  It offers quotes that are 
better-tailored to the true risk category of drivers and provides quick and easy settlement of 
claims by way of an extensive fleet of van-based adjusters.  Like Southwest Airlines, Progressive 
also  has  a  unique  activity  system  that  features  many  activities,  such  as  its  massive  pricing 
database, a fleet of claims-settling vans, unique training and compensation structures, as well as 
a unique investment philosophy, which fit together and reinforce each other to produce a service 
that is highly-valued by its customers and is produced at a competitive cost.   
A competitive cost structure is important to the differentiation strategy because having a 
premium price with a cost structure that eats up the entire premium is not a strategy for long-
term  competitive  advantage.    It  is  a  strategy  for  satisfying  customers  but  not  for  providing 
adequate returns to shareholders.  Keeping the cost structure under control requires an activity 
system that minimizes the total systems cost of providing a differentiated product or service.   
The concepts of strategy and strategic thinking have become well-accepted by firms over 
the past thirty years.  Strategy allows firms to define what they are about and most importantly 
what they are not about.  In the next section of the paper we argue that a city or region may seek 
to attain jurisdictional advantage by building an activity system that is unique and is valuable in 
producing either a low cost or differentiation advantage over other jurisdictions.     8 
 
Seeking Jurisdictional Advantage 
 
Since a jurisdiction does not have shareholders, per se, the question is for whose benefit 
should a jurisdiction seek advantage? John Locke argued that  government is the vehicle  for 
collective action (Locke 1967).  Like firms, jurisdictions are socially constructed entities that can 
raise funds, organize resources and live on in perpetuity or at least do these things better than 
individuals can.  Locke’s argument is that government is a legitimate tool by which individuals 
may further their shared interests by acting in common.  While these shared interests should not 
rest  on  any  particular  conception  of  the  common  good  or  individual  happiness,  it  is  a 
fundamental  premise  of  Locke’s  argument  that  income  and  wealth  are  instrumental  goods 
desired, to some extent, by everyone.   
A measure of the common good is the prevailing wealth in the jurisdiction.  Wealth is a 
combination of wages and investments.  For most of the world’s population, housing equity 
represents  their  single  largest  investment  and  the  value  of  jurisdictional  amenities  and  local 
quality of life is capitalized in housing prices.  Higher levels of local public services, higher local 
wages and a growing local economy all contribute to appreciation of real estate values and the 
wealth of property owners.  Since the majority of American households own their own homes 
increases in property values are broadly distributed across the population.  Moreover, increases 
in  property  values  yield  higher  tax  revenues  for  the  jurisdiction  which,  if  used  judiciously, 
increase amenities.  In this way, virtuous cycles of economic growth are created.  
Wages  are  an  important  measure  of  the  wealth  of  the  jurisdiction.    The  greater  the 
positive variance in wage levels from the mean, the greater the jurisdictional advantage from 
which the residents benefit, other things being equal.  However, there are two adjustments that 
should be made to this measure.  First, when comparing jurisdictions across countries, wages   9 
adjusted for purchasing power parity should be the measure, as is the case when comparing gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita.  Second, an additional refinement would be to adjust after-
tax wages for major differences in government services and amenities provided.  So if after-tax 
wages were used to compare jurisdictions of a US city with a Canadian city, there should be an 
adjustment for the fact that the residents of the Canadian city receive greater health care benefits 
through government expenditure.  For individuals living in the U.S more of their health care 
costs would be paid for from after-tax wages. 
Table 1 Here 
 
Table 1 presents differences in wages by jurisdiction for those industries which have 
some demonstrated competitive advantage.  As a benchmark, the average annual wage for all 
U.S. industries was approximately $33,200 in 2001.   We list city-industries that have a higher-
than-average  national  wage  for  the  industry,  a  location  quotient  greater  than  one, indicating 
geographic concentration relative to national employment, and more than 10,000 employment.  
This  table  demonstrates  that  while  cities  specialize  in  certain  industrial  clusters,  that 
specialization varies widely across cities in the same industry.   
Creating  and  sustaining  positive  wage  differentials  is  the  essence  of  jurisdictional 
advantage.  It is important to note that this is not synonymous with attracting high-technology 
industries, which has been a preoccupation of many economic development initiatives.  Many of 
the high-technology industries offer substantial employment numbers and higher than national 
average wages but they are not the only such industries.  Equally transformative are investments 
in existing, more mature industries that are already in place and can invest as a means to compete 
with lower-cost locations.  The relatively low-technology financial services cluster is one of 
highest  paying  clusters.      In  addition,  other  mature  industries,  for  example,  printing  and   10 
publishing  or  metal  manufacturing  have  continued  to  innovate  and  provide  something  that 
markets value.  Distribution and logistics is another industry that is based on efficient inventory 
control and the process of innovation 
In addition, many of theses clusters represent well-know associations between places and 
industries.  For example, distribution services in Atlanta have a long history as a transportation 
hub and Los Angeles as a concentration of entertainment.  Certain clusters, such as education 
and knowledge creation; analytical instruments, aerospace vehicles and defense; communications 
equipment; information technology; and medical devices appear to cluster together and to be 
more conducive to multiple clustering than others industries (Porter 2003).   
  Across the US economy, average wages differ greatly across and within industry clusters, 
demonstrating that some industries tend to produce higher prosperity than others.  However, 
wages in the same cluster vary substantially by jurisdiction, indicating  that jurisdictions can 
influence the level of prosperity generated by a given industry or cluster. Table 2 present four 
representative industries, one from each quartile of the distribution of industry wages.  Financial 
services are in the first quartile with mean annual wages of $75,000; medical devices are from 
the second quartile with mean annual wages of $50,000; metal manufacturing represents the third 
quartile with mean annual wages of $37,200; and, building fixture, equipment and services is in 
the bottom quartile with mean annual wages of $31,000.  Similarly, the four cities listed were 
selected  to  represent  quartiles  of  the  distribution  of  wages  within  the  industry.  Each  city 
presented  in  Table  2  had  a  location  quotient  greater  than  1,  which  indicates  to  relative 
specialization for the industry within the geographic unit
2, a minimum of one thousand workers, 
and average wages that are greater than the average wages for the city as indicated in column (3).    11 
Even when the wages are not high relative to the highest wages for the industry, they are higher 
relative to the mean city wages.   
Table 2 here 
  To construct jurisdictional advantage requires a jurisdictional strategy – a set of choices 
which  produces  a  jurisdictional  activity  system  that  generates  either  low  cost  advantage  or 
differentiation  advantage.    The  “customers”  for  a  jurisdiction  are  job-providing  entities  – 
primarily, but not exclusively, firms. Jurisdictions are, in many respects, collections of firms, 
both large and small. And just as firms are one economic entity that organizes resources and 
production, jurisdictions are themselves another economic entity that provides a platform for 
similarly  organizing  resources.    High  wage  jobs  are  the  reward  for  the  jurisdiction  that  can 
generate advantage and in doing so attract, incubate and grow firms. Jurisdictional advantage 
produces an environment that both attracts investments by existing firms to the jurisdiction and 
promotes the creation of start-up businesses in the jurisdiction.  It also produces an environment 
that helps all of these firms prosper while operating in that jurisdiction.  
The logic of endogenous growth suggests that new start-up firms will be an important 
source of growth.  New firms are based on the identification of new market opportunities and 
they frequently get started as a means to bring new technology to the market.  Most importantly, 
these firms are relatively geographically immobile as entrepreneurs build upon local networks 
and expertise.  Individuals start companies based on their prior experience and interests, typically 
fulfilling some niche that a larger firm may judge too small, exploiting a new opportunity that 
may have a risk profile unsuited to a larger firm, or using a unique set of skills and knowledge to 
develop applications.  Many individuals have location inertia because of lack of family mobility, 
simple preferences or the risk of establishing a new company in a new location. In building their   12 
companies,  entrepreneurs  rely  on  their  local  contacts,  connections,  and  knowledge  of  the 
business environment.   
History is replete with examples of co-located firms defining technological frontiers and 
speeding  up  the  rate  of  technological  advance.    The  geographic  concentrations  of  related 
industries create synergies that provide unique activity sets that promote the emergence of new 
industries: combining new knowledge with existing expertise is the essence of innovation.  New 
industries typically begin with new firm formation and the efforts of entrepreneurs.  Some of 
these  new  start-ups  will  be  gazelles  in  terms  of  rapid  growth,  creating  new  industries  and 
disrupting existing firms in their wake.  Most will be smaller players that will operate in a niche 
for which the firm has some competitive advantage.   
What is low cost in the context of jurisdictional advantage?  It is not low wages, which is 
the  first  thing  that  comes  to  mind.    A  low-wage  jurisdictional  strategy  is  like  a  low  price 
company strategy.  It does not produce advantage.  At a company, a low price strategy produces 
low profits for the shareholders and is dangerous because it leaves the company vulnerable to 
being out-invested by high-profit competitors. In a jurisdiction, a low wage strategy produces 
wages that are lower than the average of other jurisdictions which connotes disadvantage for its 
residents not advantage. 
Approaches centered on industrial recruitment with special tax incentives and various 
other inducements to lower the costs of doing business for firms are not low cost strategies 
either. There is absolutely nothing unique or hard to replicate in terms of giving dollars away to 
firms.  The evidence is that this type of strategy is a race to the bottom in a zero-sum game.  
There  is  no  evidence  that  it  leads  eventually  to  higher  wages,  which  is  the  measure  of  a   13 
successful low cost jurisdictional strategy.  Moreover, these types of operations are frequently 
the first to be closed when the cost structure changes.   
A successful low cost jurisdictional strategy would exist if a jurisdiction produces an 
equivalent  environment  to  other  jurisdictions  but  at  a  lower  cost.    For  example,  the  city  of 
Edmonton, Alberta has produced a K-12 educational system that generates among the highest 
results  of  any  North  American  jurisdiction  and  it  accomplished  this  superior  outcome  with 
below-average costs through unique approaches to management of the system (Chen and Mintz 
2004). This allows Edmonton to charge lower personal taxes, other things being equal, which 
increases the after-tax wages of residents, enhancing the competitive outcome of the jurisdiction. 
A differentiated jurisdictional strategy exists when a set of activities produces a uniquely 
attractive environment for a given segment of job-providing entities at a similar cost to other 
jurisdictions yet with greater potential benefits.  An example is the externalities available to a 
biotech firm by locating near a number of industry-leading biotech firms already operating in the 
greater-Boston area.  These externalities are outside of the ability of markets to price but there is 
evidence  to  suggest  that  firms  gain  economic  value  from  them.    Firms  are  simply  more 
productive in certain locations, better able to innovate and create unique value.  It is this greater 
productivity that translates into higher profits and higher wages.   
 
 
Jurisdictional Strategy and Jurisdictional Advantage 
The  next  concern  is  how  a  jurisdiction  may  position  itself  to  capture  economic  growth.  
Economic growth is not easy to capture: there are no guarantees. But the emerging literatures on 
growth  theory  and  the  new  economic  geography  offer  some  insights  that  may  shape 
jurisdictional advantage.  This literature is informed by the microeconomics of innovation which   14 
suggests  the  importance  of  skilled  labor  and  the  mix  or  composition  of  activities  within  a 
jurisdiction’s activity system.  The success of a firm and the success of the region are interrelated 
and endogenous in the terminology of economics and this is the basis of jurisdictional strategy 
and advantage.   
Economists have long known that industries cluster spatially for a variety of reasons: 
what is critical is that these clustered industries tend to be more innovative and have greater 
productivity which is why we observe wage premia for such clusters.  An important distinction is 
between the geographic concentrations of production and the location of innovation. Whereas the 
geographic concentrations of production is often due to the location or natural resources, ease of 
transportation or historical inertia, the location of innovation is due to knowledge externalities 
and subject to increasing returns. While innovation yields greater productivity and the increases 
in wages that jurisdictions seek, jobs associated with routine production remain geographically in 
place as long as the physical investments are economically viable.   Once physical assets are 
depreciated or obsolete, if the market changes or costs become uncompetitive, these locations are 
easily abandoned.  As a result, property values fall and the jurisdiction suffers.   
The idea that location is beneficial to firms’ innovative success is central to theorizing in 
economic geography about the benefits of cities.  Certain locations supply localized knowledge 
externalities or spillovers that provide positive economic value but are beyond the ability of 
market mechanisms to price and efficiently allocate.  The significance of localized knowledge 
spillovers as inputs to firms’ innovative activities suggest that their most creative and highest 
value-added activities do not proceed in isolation, but depend on access to new ideas.  Location 
mitigates the inherent uncertainty of innovative activity: proximity enhances the ability of firms 
to  exchange  ideas  and  be  cognizant  of  important  incipient  knowledge,  hence  reducing   15 
uncertainty for firms that work in new fields. Innovation clusters spatially where knowledge 
externalities reduce the costs of scientific discovery and commercialization. In addition, firms 
producing innovations tend to be located in areas where there are necessary resources: resources 
that have accumulated due to a region’s past success with innovation. In this way, firm success 
and city economic growth are endogenous and mutually dependent.  The cumulative nature of 
innovation manifests itself not just at firm and industry levels, but also at the geographic level, 
creating an advantage for firms locating in areas of concentrated innovative activity.  These 
factors  can  generate positive feedback loops or  virtuous cycles,  as clusters attract additional 
specialized labor and other inputs, as well as the greater exchanges of ideas.   
Economists  and  strategists  are  getting  better  at  understanding  the  dynamics  of  path 
dependence and increasing returns, both of which describe aspects of the dynamics of cluster 
growth  in  a  given  jurisdiction.    Path  dependency  implies  that  the  course  of  technological 
development or technological trajectory of specific localities is historically determined and may 
be  the  result  of  serendipity  or  small  events.    Krugman  (1990)  uses  the  example  of  candle-
wicking, a type of local craft, as a source of competitive advantage in the carpet industry and a 
reason why the industry located in Alabama.  Through such examples, the literature suggests that 
clusters are seeded by a variety of methods; however, their growth can only be facilitated by 
building upon existing resources. Clusters cannot be built just anywhere from scratch.  
Successful jurisdictions are characterized by a rich ecology of firms and institutions which 
form a specialized activity set.  A  good example is Carlsson’s (2002)  study of the polymer 
cluster in Akron, Ohio which consists of a combination of numerous and diverse small firms as 
well  as  larger,  multinational  firms.    Rosenthal  and  Strange  (2003)  find  that  agglomeration 
benefits are greater with a larger number of small firms:  the marginal effect of an employee at a   16 
small establishment is greater than that of an employee at a large firm.  This finding suggests that 
small establishments make better neighbors and increase a nearby firm’s own productivity.  In 
addition,  Carlsson  (2002)  found  that  while  the  multinationals  have  shifted  their  production 
facilities elsewhere, they have kept their polymer R&D facilities and operation headquarters in 
the area and close to the top three polymer research institutions in the United States from whom 
they source research and hire skilled labor.   
 Skilled workers, known in the literature as human capital, or alternatively as talent, are 
important to geographic clustering.  Baker and Trefler (2003) confirm that human capital is more 
productive in cities.  Cities act as magnets for human capital and individuals living in cities 
receive a wage premium when compared to similar individuals.  Labor is less mobile than capital 
and workers become more skilled as they age but then correspondingly become more immobile 
as they form relationships, raise families and become members of communities.  One important 
advantage of geographic clustering is that it provides pools of skilled labor which are mutually 
beneficial as firms can easily find specialized skilled labor and workers can advance their careers 
by moving between firms without incurring the costs of relocating.   
Within these pools of skilled labor there are potential entrepreneurs who may take ideas 
out  of  established  firms  to  form  new  enterprises.    An  observed  anecdote  fact  about 
entrepreneurship is that individuals do not relocate to start firms but instead use existing local 
contacts  and  networks  to  start  their  firms  (Feldman  2001).    This  form  of  locational  inertia 
indicates that regions that hold stocks of potential entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful 
at promoting new firm start-ups and establishing new industries.  Innovative start-ups frequently 
create new markets where no competition exists and demand is not sensitive to product costs.  
Small firms frequently become the mechanism by which a new technology is commercialized   17 
and their competitive advantage lies in being first to market or offer a higher-quality product.  
Lacking the resources of their larger counterparts, small firms must leverage capabilities in their 
local environments.   
The composition of activities in a jurisdictional activity system matters.  Jacobs (1969) 
argues that diversity is important for innovation and that cities are the source of considerable 
innovation because the diversity of knowledge is greatest in cities. According to Jacobs, it is the 
exchange of complementary knowledge across diverse firms and economic agents which yield a 
greater return to economic activity.  Feldman and Audretsch (1999) find that diversity across 
complementary  economic  activities  sharing  a  common  science  base  is  more  conducive  to 
innovation than is local specialisation. In addition, their results indicate that the degree of local 
competition for new ideas within a city is more conducive to innovative activity than in a local 
monopoly.   Indeed, we may expect that if a local economy becomes too dependent on one firm 
or one industry it may drive out new ideas.  Florida and Gates (2002) argue further that a rich 
cultural environment in a jurisdiction is correlated with economic success of the city.  They use 
the share of workers in artistic industries such as writers, dancers, painters, and others as an 
indicator of cultural richness and find a correlation with economic success.  In addition, they also 
find  a  link  between  the  levels  of  open-mindedness  in  a  jurisdiction  to  be  correlated  with 
economic success.    
Porter  (1990)  studied  clusters  around  the  world  and  we  now  know  the  features  of  a 
jurisdictional environment in which clusters grow. Porter described clusters as a local “diamond” 
– representing the beneficial interaction of 1) demanding and sophisticated local customers; 2) 
intense rivalry among local firms; 3) local presence of attractive factors of production; and 4) 
local  presence  of  relating  and  supporting  industries.    These  four  factors  interact  to  drive   18 
continuous innovation and upgrading of the nature of advantage by the firms in the cluster. We 
are also learning how clusters interact with each other – that is, the clustering of clusters (Porter 
2003).  Certain clusters, for example, education and knowledge creation; analytical instruments, 
aerospace  vehicles  and  defense;  communications  equipment;  information  technology;  and 
medical devices appear to cluster with together.  The synergies between these industries provide 
unique activity sets, and areas with multiple and overlapping clusters of expertise facilitate the 
emergence  of  new  industries  such  as  nanotechnology,  bioinformatics  and  advanced 
telecommunications.    
It is clear that jurisdictional strategy is not a winner-take-all phenomenon in which a 
single city comes to dominate.  No jurisdiction found on the planet is good at most industries. 
Each jurisdictional activity system appears to be tuned for certain industries and not for others.  .  
Moreover,  cities  are  part  of  the  system  of  cities  or  what  urban  economists  call  an  urban 
hierarchy: every city has a unique niche that is interrelated to other cities.  Puga and Duranton 
(2001) find that new products tend to be developed in large, diversified cities which they term 
nursery cities, the places where new products are incubated.  Once an idea is refined, the firm 
invests in more specialized, smaller cities where production costs are lower due to an emphasis 
on process innovation and learning-by-doing.  Each type of innovation requires a different mix 
of skills; however, innovations are complementary and each has a role to play in competitive 
advantage.   
However,  it  does  appear  in  North  America  at  least,  that  very  large  cities  foster  the 
clustering of clusters, which produces even higher wage levels than would be expected under a 
straight line regression (Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity 2003).  This also appears to 
be the case in the U.K., with London emerging as a cluster of clusters.  Very few cities will be at   19 
the top tier of the urban hierarchy; however, every jurisdictional activity set has a place in the 
hierarchy.   Understanding how a city is positioned relative to other cities, not in a competitive 
sense but in terms of mutual dependence and differentiation offer a potential strategic lever.   
Uniqueness  and  adaptation,  not  uniformity  and  replication,  provide  jurisdictional 
advantage.  In corporate strategy, if all competitors simply benchmark against each other and 
replicate what each other is doing, there will be no advantage and the benefits will  flow to the 
customers, who will simply play off the look-alike firms against each other to suppress prices.  
Exactly the same principle may be expected to hold for jurisdictions.  Competive advantage and 
economic  growth  may  come  from  the  creation  of  unique  activity  systems,  not  from  simply 
replicating  one  another.  Benchmarking  is  currently  a  very  popular  notion  in  economic 
development  policy,  but  the  problem  with  benchmarking  is  that  it  appears  to  encourage 
duplication and uniformity, not diversity and the exploration of unique advantage. 
 
The Role of Firms in Jurisdictional Advantage 
 
There is a big question as to the role of firms in jurisdictional advantage. A firm can act 
simply as a taker and exploiter of a jurisdiction.  However, a firm is better served by being an 
active partner in jurisdictional advantage rather than a passive taker.  As soon as it has made 
investments  in  a  jurisdiction,  it  has  an  incentive  to  make  the  jurisdiction  better  so  that  the 
jurisdiction provides more advantages in the future.   
Moreover, the existence of externalities suggests that firms are receiving benefits that are 
outside of the market mechanism to price.  While it may be argued that firms pay more taxes as a 
result of the higher profits they earn as a result of externalities, it may also be argued that firms 
may actively cultivate the sources of the agglomerative benefit by investing in local universities, 
building infrastructure, etc.  Moreover, these investments are tax deductible and provide a means   20 
to make targeted investments in jurisdictions rather than relying on the process of government 
budgeting.  This is to say that firms may actively build the external resources and infrastructure 
that benefit their bottom line.   
There  is  case  study  evidence  that  in  the  process  of  building  their  firm  expertise, 
entrepreneurs also contribute to building external resources and institutions that promote their 
business interest.  In the process of building their firms, entrepreneurs contribute to growing the 
cluster (Feldman 2001). Sponsoring research at local universities, endowing university training 
programs and networking all benefit the initiating firm but also create externalities that will have 
local benefit. As entrepreneurial businesses begin to thrive, resources such as money, networks, 
experts, and related services develop in, and are attracted to, the region. With this infrastructure 
in place, more entrepreneurial ventures locate and thrive in the region, which ultimately may 
create a thriving cluster where none previously existed. 
In addition, there are interesting interplays between firms  and the average wage level of 
residents of the jurisdiction.  In many senses, the better definition of advantage may be the total 
utility of residents, which includes non-pecuniary benefits as well as monetary benefits.  Firms 
can positively influence the overall welfare of residents in the jurisdiction by showing aspects of 
social responsibility which produce externalities that further enhance the jurisdiction and also 
benefit the firm. 
Corporate outsourcing is also interesting in its relation to jurisdictional advantage. Outsourcing is 
not  an  issue  of  jurisdictional  advantage  or  disadvantage  per  se.    Bangalore  does  not  have 
jurisdictional advantage over Silicon Valley.  Bangalore is a price leader, not a cost leader.  It 
produces  dramatically  lower  wage  levels  than  Silicon  Valley,  so  in  this  respect  it  is  highly 
disadvantaged.  (Even as Bangalore is powerfully advantaged over other parts of India.)This is   21 
not jurisdictional as much as it is individual.  It turns out that many rote programmers, call centre 
attendants,  etc.  are  learning  to  their  dismay  that  thanks  to  falling  telecommunications  and 
coordination costs, the clearing price for their skill-set in Silicon Valley is a fraction of what it 
used to be. 
An  issue,  however,  is  whether  the  firm  has  a  responsibility  to  its  jurisdiction  not  to 
outsource because of the dislocation costs that outsourcing causes.  There is no clear answer on 
this issue.  What is clear is that as firms outsource jobs from Silicon Valley to Bangalore, they 
are reducing the number of existing high wage jobs in Silicon Valley.  The question is whether 
they can create an equal number of new high paying jobs locally.  If they can’t, the employment 
base in Silicon Valley will drop.  To the extent that the jurisdiction benefited from the economies 
of scale associated with large numbers of skilled workers, firms that engage in the net export of 
high-paying jobs may negatively impact the jurisdictional advantage of their home territory. 
We may ask what firms lose when they outsource.  There are various historical examples, 
such  as  semiconductors,  where  the  countries  that  were  the  site  of  outsourcing  became 
competitors in subsequent rounds of product development.  What is lost in outsourcing may be a 
familiarity with production and product design that suggest the next round of innovation (Pisano 
1995).  Chesbrough and Teece (1996) argue that outsourcing may hamper the kind of complex, 
systematic innovation that creates new generation valuable business breakthroughs.   
 
Important Issues to Tackle in Jurisdictional Advantage 
 
The challenge for jurisdictional advantage is the translation of theory into practical policy 
terms.    Many  existing  recommendations  are  far  too  generic,  emphasizing  the  desirability  of 
having an educated, creative, and productively efficient workforce, along with strong physical 
infrastructure and great centers for research and teaching. Specific recommendations are usually   22 
based on reinforcing those activities that a location is currently specialized in – in other words, 
those economic sectors and activities that make up a high share of a city’s activities.    
Jurisdictional  advantage  depends  on  an  additional  criterion:    those  activities  and 
capabilities  which,  in  combination,  create  a  uniquely  favorable  jurisdiction  for  some  set  of 
industries.  While generic capabilities are important, there are far too many locations that satisfy 
basic  criteria:  a  highly  educated  workforce,  by  itself,  is  no  guarantee  for  a  city-specific 
advantage.   
Similarly, simply being specialized in an activity does not mean that a region has a strong 
advantage in that activity. As we have shown earlier, a jurisdiction can have a disproportionately 
high number of jobs in a given cluster and still have below average wage levels in that cluster. 
Instead, jurisdictional advantage could be established and maintained by implementing policies 
that enhance unique and location-specific capabilities. 
In this context, a key question is in what practical, action-oriented ways can jurisdictions 
build a coherent activity system?   Given the importance of the private choices of firms and 
employees, it is unlikely that successful jurisdictional activity systems will be built exclusively 
or even primarily by governments. Most likely, it will require the cooperation of governments 
and  firms.    An  important  responsibility  for  governments  will  be  to  create  incentives  that 
encourage  firms  and  talented  employees  to  take  positive  cluster  and  jurisdiction-building 
activities.  
Taxation policy is likely to be critical.  It is unlikely that bidding wars based on targeted 
tax relief to attract a firm to the jurisdiction may create a positive benefit because of the ability of 
other jurisdictions to provide the same benefits.    A tax system that understands the needs of the 
specific clusters of interest for the jurisdiction is most likely to produce beneficial results.  For   23 
example, tradable tax credits allow start-up firms to sell their net operating losses and research 
and development spending to profitable companies or selling the credits back to the state.   Mintz 
(2001)  argues  that  the  marginal  tax  burden  on  capital  and  labor  prevalent  in  a  jurisdiction 
influences its prosperity.  Therefore spending programs that are designed to attract firms (directly 
or indirectly) may benefit from empirical analysis that quantifies the purported positive impacts 
netted against their costs in terms of higher marginal tax burden in order to ascertain whether 
these incentives produce net benefits or costs.   
One element that has no chance of being unique is the payment of cash incentives to 
firms.  Cash  is  completely  fungible  and  for  that  reason,  it  is  the  easiest  feature  for  another 
jurisdiction to match.  Further, cash used as an incentive has no effective leverage.  It costs 
residents of the jurisdiction dollar for dollar against potential personal after-tax income rather 
than, for example, a badly needed bridge which has the prospect of earning a very high return on 
the investment made. 
The  evidence  is  that  firm  location  decisions  are  not  responsive  to  jurisdictional  tax 
differentials except at the intra-metropolitan area (Bartik 1991, Papke 1991).   This suggests that 
individual municipalities may gain if they drop their tax rates or offer special incentives.  Of 
course, this creates artificial competition.  Individual municipalities may benefit if they view 
themselves as subsidiaries or divisions of the larger city and cooperate to their mutual advantage.   
In  the  knowledge-based  economy,  social  policy  may  not  be  discounted  as  something 
alien  to  jurisdictional  advantage.    It  appears  to  be  an  integral  part  of  jurisdictional  strategy 
(Porter 1999, Florida and Gates 2002).  Attributes that make a jurisdiction an attractive place for 
talented  workers  to  locate  are  powerful  elements  in  the  activity  system  of  successful 
jurisdictions.  The question, as always in jurisdictional strategy, is whether a given social policy   24 
creates more benefit in raising the psychic income and quality of life of residents than it takes 
away in the taxation required to support it. 
In establishing policy, jurisdictions will have to find ways to be as nimble as the firms 
they  host.  Successful  firms  are  constantly  remaking  themselves  and  reinventing  their  core 
businesses in response to changing market conditions.  Many times it is easier for them to move 
to a new location rather than work with the confines of an existing jurisdiction. It might be 
incumbent on jurisdictions to change that equation by being responsive and open to working with 
their resident firms.  A frequent complaint is that local government only pay attention to a firm 
when it threatens to leave, rather than cultivating an on-going relationship with the firm.  
Jurisdictional advantage is not simply the battle for high technology industries.  In no 
jurisdiction do high technology industries make up a majority of jobs. Even in high-technology 
states such as Massachusetts and California, high-technology clusters account for less than 20% 
of jobs (Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity 2003).  While high technology clusters may 
be attractive, there is as much to be gained by creating a unique activity system for a non-high 
technology cluster as to replicate the features of numerous other jurisdictions that are pining after 
high technology industries.  
Cities remake themselves over time, reflecting structural change in the economy. Glaeser 
(2003) shows how Boston has been able to remake its economy three times since the Colonial 
period, due to the availability of local skilled capital. Of course, these transitions are costly to 
individuals and their families when skill sets become obsolete and jobs disappear. This reiterates 
the  importance  of  social  policy  as  a  backbone  of  industrial  competitiveness  and  economic 
growth.     25 
In  corporate  strategy,  there  is  an  immense  variety  of  activity  systems  that  provide 
competitive advantage. It is likely to be the case with jurisdictional strategy.  While many firms 
look longingly at Walmart or Dell and decide they need to pursue a “Walmart strategy” or a 
“Dell  strategy”,  they  are  much  more  likely  to  produce  a  successful  strategy  by  pursuing  an 
approach that is tailored to particular circumstance and assets.  Similarly, jurisdictions that try to 
be  the  next  Boston  or  Silicon  Valley  may  be  pursuing  the  wrong  approach  to  jurisdictional 
advantage.    Any  commitments  of  resources  to  an  activity  involve  trade-offs  against  other 
opportunities.    We  have  suggested  that  building  jurisdictional  advantage  necessitates  an 
understanding  of  what  not  to  do  and  how  investments  detract  from  the  coherence  of  the 
jurisdictional activity set: policy-makers will be required to investigate further into just how to 
do this at the particular sites they make decisions for.    
As with the multiplicity of outcomes of jurisdictional strategy, there are likely to be many 
different models that emerge with respect to how jurisdictions organize themselves to facilitate 
the creation and implementation of jurisdictional strategies.  Cities are far from homogeneous 
with different functional and industrial specialization, each with a unique position relative to 
other cities in the economy.  Even more so than with corporate strategy, jurisdictional strategy is 
likely to only in part be an analytical, top-down exercise.  It is also likely to be an intensely 
social consensus-building exercise.  As such, the role of political leadership in jurisdictional 
strategy is likely to be crucial.    
At the national level, it will be increasingly important to understand the role of individual 
city  jurisdictions  play  in  competitive  advantage.    If  a  nation  is  comprised  of  individual 
jurisdictions – each following copy-cat strategies of using cash incentives to attempt to attract the 
currently vogue industries (e.g. biotechnology or nanotechnology) to their jurisdiction rather than   26 
another national jurisdiction – the nations’ prosperity potential will be diminished.  If instead, the 
nation is comprised of individual jurisdictions each attempting to create an activity system that is 
uniquely beneficial to a particular cluster or agglomeration of clusters by investing in attributes 
that make it particularly attractive to firms and talent in those clusters, the nation will have 
increased prosperity potential.  In this paper we have argued that jurisdictions may benefit from a 
strategic orientation that considers 1) the unique and not easily replicated assets, resources and 
skill set contained in a jurisdiction; 2) the position of the jurisdiction vis a vis the hierarchy of 
cities in the national and world economy; and 3) maximizes wages and property values within 
the  juridiction.    What  we  have  suggested  is  that  the  role  of  jurisdictions  and  jurisdictional 
advantage deserves a place on the policy agenda.   
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Wages  Industry Cluster  
Atlanta, GA  56,129  2.8  1.51  $59,783   Distribution Services 
Atlanta, GA   148,591  3  1.6  $56,152   Business Services 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC  20,053  4.8  30.96  $50,352   Chemical Products 
Baltimore, MD   12,034  1.6  1.74  $61,459   Analytical Instruments 
Baltimore, MD   41,501  1.8  1.94  $45,903   Education and Knowledge Creation 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ   15,945  1.7  2.95  $57,345   Publishing and Printing 
Birmingham, AL   11,865  0.9  2.31  $44,210   Metal Manufacturing 
Boston   158,727  4.7  1.75  $92,432   Financial Services 
Boston   54,811  6  2.25  $77,380   Information Technology 
Boston   35,210  7.9  2.94  $75,875   Communications Equipment  
Boston   209,555  4.2  1.56  $67,853   Business Services 
Boston   76,299  3.8  1.42  $64,680   Distribution Services 
Boston   23,238  6.3  2.35  $59,361   Medical Devices  
Chicago, IL   158,055  4.7  1.37  $86,033   Financial Services 
Chicago, IL   214,430  4.3  1.25  $61,173   Business Services 
Chicago, IL   40,846  9.1  2.68  $59,679   Communications Equipment  
Chicago, IL   87,392  4.3  1.28  $58,551   Distribution Services 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  15,015  1.1  1.53  $36,603   Processed Food 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria  20,876  3.2  3.46  $47,829   Production Technology 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria  26,960  2.1  2.26  $46,692   Automotive  
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria  14,610  1.8  1.88  $38,754   Oil and Gas Products and Services 
Dallas, TX   29,052  6.5  3.9  $71,003   Communications Equipment  
Dallas, TX   10,253  2.6  1.54  $64,697   Oil and Gas Products and Services 
Dallas, TX   59,094  2.9  1.76  $61,521   Distribution Services 
Dallas, TX   121,056  2.4  1.45  $60,309   Business Services 
Denver, CO   73,909  1.5  1.57  $57,173   Business Services 
Detroit, MI   138,769  10.9  6.41  $54,082   Automotive  
Detroit, MI   20,831  3.2  1.9  $49,290   Production Technology 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN   16,833  5.9  62.03  $35,112   Prefabricated Enclosures 
Flint, MI   17,282  1.4  10.73  $48,404   Automotive  
Fort Wayne, IN   16,218  1.3  6.01  $49,399   Automotive  
Gary, IN   27,400  2  10.28  $52,849   Metal Manufacturing 
Grand Rapids  32,126  2.5  5.46  $46,289   Automotive  
Hartford, CT   14,207  15.8  32.02  $78,031   Aerospace Engines   
Hickory, NC   10,004  2.1  14.3  $39,128   Apparel 
Houston, TX   66,657  16.6  10.23  $66,786   Oil and Gas Products and Services 
Houston, TX   15,189  3.6  2.22  $65,260   Chemical Products 
Houston, TX   109,070  2.2  1.33  $58,980   Business Services 
Houston, TX   50,862  3.1  1.93  $45,766   Transportation and Logistics     33 













Wages  Industry Cluster  
Houston, TX   69,832  3.8  2.32  $42,834   Heavy Construction Services 
Indianapolis, IN   12,831  0.9  1.34  $38,369   Metal Manufacturing 
Los Angeles-Long Beach  18,517  4.1  1.22  $63,183   Communications Equipment  
Los Angeles-Long Beach  51,679  13.8  4.09  $58,420   Aerospace Vehicles 
Los Angeles-Long Beach  177,625  16.2  4.79  $57,800   Entertainment 
Los Angeles-Long Beach  84,820  5.2  1.55  $45,397   Transportation and Logistics   
Los Angeles-Long Beach  97,201  4.2  1.24  $36,133   Education and Knowledge Creation 
Middlesex-Somerset, NJ   63,467  1.3  2.32  $66,985   Business Services 
Middlesex-Somerset, NJ   27,685  1.4  2.52  $61,584   Distribution Services 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI   19,002  2.9  4.34  $45,091   Production Technology 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI   21,842  1.6  2.37  $38,835   Metal Manufacturing 
Minneapolis-St. Paul  18,683  2.5  1.75  $53,438   Analytical Instruments 
Minneapolis-St. Paul  20,065  5.4  3.8  $51,806   Medical Devices  
Minneapolis-St. Paul  13,622  2.1  1.48  $41,023   Production Technology 
Minneapolis-St. Paul  25,479  1.9  1.31  $40,637   Metal Manufacturing 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY   11,637  1.2  1.27  $46,353   Publishing and Printing 
New Haven, CT  29,699  1.3  1.86  $52,508   Education and Knowledge Creation 
New York, NY   316,922  9.4  2.8  $197,932   Financial Services 
New York, NY   74,939  7.8  2.33  $70,946   Publishing and Printing 
New York, NY   63,529  5.8  1.73  $62,215   Entertainment 
New York, NY   101,419  5  1.51  $60,767   Distribution Services 
New York, NY   75,249  4.6  1.39  $45,317   Transportation and Logistics   
New York, NY   29,807  24.6  7.34  $40,021   Jewelry and Precious Metals 
New York, NY   151,514  6.5  1.96  $39,511   Education and Knowledge Creation 
Newark, NJ   21,619  8.2  10.04  $67,911   Biopharmaceuticals 
Newark, NJ   31,830  1.6  1.93  $61,268   Distribution Services 
Newark, NJ   39,777  2.5  2.99  $43,270   Transportation and Logistics 
Oakland, CA   19,104  2.1  2.41  $100,139   Information Technology 
Oakland, CA   14,675  2  2.26  $69,869   Analytical Instruments 
Oakland, CA   71,694  1.4  1.64  $66,537   Business Services 
Orange County, CA   43,632  2.2  1.77  $55,800   Distribution Services 
Orange County, CA   84,540  1.7  1.37  $55,305   Business Services 
Orange County, CA   10,625  2.9  2.35  $51,700   Medical Devices  
Orange County, CA   12,326  1.5  1.21  $35,591   Oil and Gas Products and Services 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  9,878  3.8  1.93  $86,730   Biopharmaceuticals 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  126,249  2.5  1.29  $58,795   Business Services 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  48,384  2.4  1.24  $56,805   Distribution Services 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  27,268  2.8  1.46  $43,284   Publishing and Printing 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  88,332  3.8  1.96  $38,504   Education and Knowledge Creation 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ   15,331  2  1.68  $53,945   Analytical Instruments 
Pittsburgh, PA   26,910  2  2.19  $45,545   Metal Manufacturing   34 
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Pittsburgh, PA   43,504  1.9  2.08  $32,817   Education and Knowledge Creation 
Portland-  10,844  1.4  1.9  $65,845   Analytical Instruments 
Raleigh-Durham  32,349  1.4  2.62  $51,518   Education and Knowledge Creation 
San Antonio, TX   26,285  1.4  2.57  $38,964   Heavy Construction Services 
San Diego, CA   28,001  1.4  1.48  $83,345   Distribution Services 
San Diego, CA   42,826  1.8  1.97  $56,348   Education and Knowledge Creation 
San Diego, CA   13,483  1.8  1.92  $56,319   Analytical Instruments 
San Francisco, CA   59,033  1.7  1.91  $140,797   Financial Services 
San Francisco, CA   26,325  2.9  3.17  $119,291   Information Technology 
San Francisco, CA   104,749  2.1  2.29  $81,806   Business Services 
San Francisco, CA   25,564  1.3  1.39  $70,779   Distribution Services 
San Francisco, CA   11,389  1.2  1.3  $63,823   Publishing and Printing 
San Francisco, CA   27,322  1.2  1.29  $56,554   Education and Knowledge Creation 
San Francisco, CA   34,604  2.1  2.34  $40,466   Transportation and Logistics   
San Francisco, CA   16,227  1.5  1.62  $34,035   Entertainment 
San Jose, CA   52,982  2.6  2.9  $109,766   Distribution Services 
San Jose, CA   92,453  10.2  11.2  $108,801   Information Technology 
San Jose, CA   121,537  2.4  2.67  $89,569   Business Services 
San Jose, CA   40,001  1.7  1.91  $83,827   Education and Knowledge Creation 
San Jose, CA   24,592  5.5  6.06  $81,775   Communications Equipment  
San Jose, CA   12,536  3.4  3.74  $76,901   Medical Devices  
San Jose, CA   48,569  6.5  7.16  $74,991   Analytical Instruments 
Seattle, WA   37,469  4.1  3.72  $228,178   Information Technology 
Seattle, WA   29,856  1.5  1.34  $59,477   Distribution Services 
Seattle WA   38,166  2.4  2.13  $48,397   Transportation and Logistics   
St. Louis, MO-IL  14,213  1.3  1.22  $85,875   Entertainment 
Toledo, OH   20,722  1.6  6.55  $49,607   Automotive  
Washington, DC  336,576  6.7  3.38  $69,438   Business Services 
Washington, DC  24,867  2.6  1.31  $54,645   Publishing and Printing 
Washington, DC  92,942  4  2.03  $48,604   Education and Knowledge Creation 
West Palm Beach  10,122  2.3  5.54  $67,379   Communications Equipment  
Source:  Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Cluster Mapping Project:  http://data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/index.jsp     
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Table 2:  Average wages differ greatly across and within industry clusters  
(2) 
   Average Wages 
(3) Ratio of Wages to Average City 
Wage 
Financial Services 
New Haven, CT   169,699  3.46 
Chattanooga, TN-GA  58,381  2.09 
Salem, OR   48,628  1.84 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN  42,882  1.6 
Medical Devices 
Oakland, CA   82,855  1.88 
Milwaukee, WI   55,676  1.58 
Salt Lake City, UT   46,390  1.53 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  39,847  1.43 
Metal Manufacturing 
Gary, IN   52,849  1.72 
Buffalo, NY   38,291  1.27 
Chattanooga, TN-GA  33,549  1.2 
Scranton, PA   31,725  1.23 
Building Fixtures, Equipment and Services 
Grand Rapids, MI   39,699  1.21 
Cleveland , OH   37,271  1.11 
Lancaster, PA   33,064  1.12 
Oklahoma City, OK   30,532  1.13 
Source:  Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Cluster Mapping Project: http://data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/index.jsp      36 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 We will use the term city to refer to the integrated economic entity such as the metropolitan statistical areas as 
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.   Thus, we focus on the city as a focal point for economic activity as when 
people say that they live in L.A. while their residence is in West Hollywood.  This use of the term city typically 
encompasses multiple political or administrative units. Rather than viewing themselves in competition these units 
may be conceptualized as subsidiaries, divisions or subunits of a going concern.   
2 The location quotient is calculated as the percentage of activity in a city and industry normalized by the national 
percentage of activity in the industry.  A location quotient equal to one indicates that the activity is represented in 
the city exactly as mirrored in the national economy.  When the location quotient is greater than one the industry has 
a greater representation in the city than would be expected and this is evidence of geographic concentration.   The 
larger the location quotient, the greater the concentration of the industry in the city.   